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McNamara: Tortious Breach of Contract in Oklahoma

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTIOUS BREACH OF CONTRACT IN
OKLAHOMA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether punitive damages' should be allowed for breach of con-

tract continues to be a live issue in tort and contract law.2 Historically,
punitive damages have been recoverable in tort, but not in contract
actions.3 The courts have gradually circumvented this traditional rule
1. Punitive or exemplary damages are defined as:
[D]amages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will
barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked
conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental
anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example
of him, for which reason they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages. Unlike compensatory or actual damages, punitive or exemplary damages are based upon an entirely different public policy consideration-that of punishing
the defendant or of setting an example for similar wrongdoers, as above noted. In cases
in which it is proved that a defendant has acted willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently, a
plaintiff may be awarded exemplary damages in addition to compensatory or actual
damages. Damages other than compensatory damages which may be awarded against
[a] person to punish him for outrageous conduct.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1983).
2. Berstein, Recovery fPunitive Damages/orBreachof a ContractImpliedin Law, 34 S.C.L.
REV. 32 (1982); Coleman, PunitiveDamages/orBreach o/Contract: A New Approach, 11 STETSON
L. REV. 250 (1981-82); Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, I/ at all,
Should it Be Extended Beyond lnsuranceTransactionsg64 MARQ. L. REv. 425 (1981); Hill, Breach
ofContractas a Tort, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1974); Louderback & Jurika, StandardsforLimiting
the Tort oBadFaith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REv. 187 (1982); Rice, Exemplary Damages
in Private ConsumerActions, 55 IowA L. REv. 307 (1969); Sassaman, Punitive Damagesin Contract
Actions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980); Shaller, The
Availability ofPunitiveDamages imBreachofContractActions Under301 ofthe Labor Management
RelationsAct, 50 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 219 (1982); Simpson, Punitive DamagesforBreach o/Contract, 20 OHIo ST. LJ. 284 (1959); Stem, Will the Tort ofBad Faith Breach or Contractbe Extended to Health MaintenanceOrganizations 11 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CAPE 12 (1983); Sullivan,
Punitive Damages in the Law oContract: The Reality and the Illusion ofLegal Change, 61 MNN.
L. REV. 207 (1977); Note, The Expanding Availability oPunitive Damages in ContractActions,8
IND. L. REV. 668 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, The ExpandingAvailabilit)j;Comment, Actions:
Tortious Breach of Contract,A Plaintffis Dilemma, 26 OKLA. L. REy. 249 (1973); Note, Punitive
Damagesfor Breach ofContract in South Carolina,10 S.C.L. REv. 444 (1958); Note, Exemplary
Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971). See also J. McCARTHY, PUNITIVE
DAmAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982).
3. See infra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
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by allowing punitive damages for a breach of contract under a tort theory.4 Although most courts have limited the fiction to specific types of
circumstances5 and have not made the remedy available to all breach
of contract claims, there appears to be a trend toward the creation of a
new tort that could apply to any sufficiently malicious breach of
contract.6
This Comment will attempt to summarize the current methods
used by the courts to award punitive damages for breach of contract,
while discussing the emergence of a new tort for the malicious breach
of contract. Finally, Oklahoma case law will be analyzed and an approach suggested for Oklahoma courts to follow in the future. This
Comment will not focus on the reasoning behind the principles differentiating tort and contract law. Likewise, it will not attempt to analyze
the bases or economics behind punitive awards.
II.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF ToRTIous BREACH

Judicial approaches to the issue of awarding punitive damages for
breach of contract can be categorized, at least theoretically, into a
scheme of three progressively more liberal views. The traditional view
adheres to the general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable
in breach of contract actions, irrespective of the breaching party's motives.7 The traditional approach has been subject to a great deal of
criticism and has generated numerous exceptions.8 These exceptions
form what this Comment will refer to as the "middle view." In order to
fall within one of these exceptions two requirements must be met:
(1) there must be a separate implied duty arising outside of the contract
and (2) the breach must involve malice, fraud, gross negligence, wantonness, or oppressive behavior. Under the third view, punitives could
be awarded without a breach of an implied duty, provided the second
4. One commentator has characterized the judicial attitudes in recent cases as to which side
of the tort-contract borderline an action fell as being "more casual than calculated." Sullivan,
supra note 2, at 252.
5. See infra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
7. See 25 CJ.S. Damages § 120, at 1126-28 (1966); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 245, at 337
(1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch.
16 intro. note, at 100 (1979); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338, at
197-99, § 1340, at 209-10 (3d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1983).
8. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 615-16 (4th ed. 1971); 22

AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 245, at 337 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120, at 1128-29 (1966); 11 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 1340, at 211-12.
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requirement is met. 9 In order to better understand the evolutionary
process, each of the views will be discussed separately.
A.

The Traditional View

Contract law, in its essential design, is a law of strict liability, and
the accompanying system of remedies operates without regard to
fault.' 0 Hence, the long recognized general rule, supported by an overwhelming weight of authority, is that exemplary damages are not recoverable for breach of contract."
The traditional view encompasses those decisions which have expressly declined to view a malicious or bad faith breach as a tort, thus
limiting the remedy to contract law and compensatory damages. Cases
following the traditional view'" often 3state that there was no tortious
behavior independent of the contract.'
The courts have stated a variety of explanations supporting the
traditional view.' 4 One view holds that breach of contract is not suffi9. See e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (1975) (bad
faith failure to pay building contractor); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 433, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (wrongful termination of employment); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho
902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969) (sale of second-hand automobile as new); Bank of N.M. v. Rice, 78 N.M.
170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967) (malicious breach of bank loan contract); Sweet v. Grange Mut. Casualty
Co., 50 Ohio App. 2d 401, 4 Ohio Op. 3d 399 (1975) (malicious failure to settle insurance claim).
10. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 842 (1982). "[N]o matter how reprehensible the
breach, damages that are punitive.... are not ordinarily awarded. . . . [It is] a rule oblivious
Id.
I..."
to blame .
11. Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1345-46 (1933).
12. See, e.g., Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) ("If a contract
is broken the measure of damages generally is the same, whatever the cause of breach."); Wood v.
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering System, 409 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (punitives not recoverable
in dispute over debt on conversion of crude oil since "debt sounds in contract, and under the law
of Alabama the motive or intent of the debtor is not material"); White v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, 107 A.2d 892, 894 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954) (court declares relief could not be granted on
claim that breach of contract was "in bad faith," per defendant's "motives of self interest," and to
"embarrass plaintiff financially and adversely affect his credit standing"); Den v. Den, 222 A.2d
647, 648 (D.C. 1966) (punitives are not allowed "regardless of. . . motive" in a dispute involving
separation agreement payments); Tanshnek v. Tanshnek, 630 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (reversing award of punitives since independent tort not proven, even if the "breach was
brought about intentionally, capriciously and with malice"); McDonough v. Zamora, 338 S.W.2d
507, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (dispute where a gambler stopped payment on two checks, punitives not allowed "though the breach is brought about capriciously and with malice"); White v.
Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, ..._, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967) (dispute over use of water supply, court
held punitives, without exception, are not available in contract actions "even if the breach, as in
the instant case is willful").
13. E.g., Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980); Sawyer
v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1978); Tanshnek v.
Tanshnek, 630 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Coleman, supranote 2, at 13 n.13.
14. [O]ne of the principal impediments to analysis of contract cases treating the question
of punitive damages is the consistent absence, particularly in the early cases, of any
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ciently repugnant as a matter of public policy to warrant punitives.' 5
Possibly contributing to this view is the perception that breach is so
common an occurrence that it is an accepted risk. 6
A second view is that an extension of the doctrine of punitive damages into the commercial field would introduce uncertainty and confusion in business transactions.' 7 The evils of uncertainty in the business
world were discussed in the landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale"8 in

which the court established the black letter law that damages should be
limited by the concepts of foreseeability and the probable consequences
of breach. The rationale followed in Hadley could equally apply to
punitive damages.' 9 In other words, Hadley appears to opine that the
benefits which might follow from awarding punitive damages are outweighed by the uncertainty and apprehension it would create at
market.
Another explanation for the limitations on damages for breach is
that economically efficient breaches are socially beneficial and should
meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of damage law. ... Whatever the explanation, we must begin without any firm idea of why, beyond adherence to traditional
English standards, American courts have held [to the] general rule ....
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 221.
15. See5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1964) ("Breaches. . . do not in
general cause as much resentment and physical discomfort as do the wrongs called torts ....
[t]herefore the remedies to prevent them are not so severe."); see also Simpson, supranote 2, at 284
(referring to the "feeling that ...

compensatory damages is an adequate remedy.

.. "

and that

punitives would be an "unequal weighting of the scales.").
16. See, e.g., Iron Mtn. Security Storage v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158
(E.D. Pa. 1978). In this often cited case, the court declined to expand tort liability for bad faith
breach beyond insurance contracts, fearing most contract violators would then be subject to liability. fd. at 1165.
17. See C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 286 (1935); Simpson, supra note 2, at

284.
18. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley was an attempt by the court to encourage commercial
transactions in a maturing British economy. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.14, at 873
'(1982) (explaining "[a] solicitude for burgeoning enterprise" led to Hadley's rules curbing jury
discretion to assess punitives); Patterson, The 4pportionment of BusinessRisk Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 335, 342 (1924) ("the law ...

manifests a policy to encourage the

entrepreneur by reducing the extent of his risk below that amount ... the promisee has actually
been caused to suffer."). But cf Dansig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof
the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975). Dansig argues that industrial development was only partly
the cause of Hadley. Id. at 259. Dansig also points out the very interesting fact that Hadley was
handed down at a time when principals were personally liable for the misfeasance of their companies. Id at 263. Dansig concludes, "[u]nder these conditions a severe restriction on the scope of
damages in contract actions must have seemed both less alien than it would have appeared to a
judge a decade earlier, and more important than it would have seemed to a judge a decade later."
Id

See also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF A CoNTRAcr (1974). Gilmore stated that Hadley "is

still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in the jurisprudential firmament." Id at 83. He
also makes the unorthodox suggestion that Hadley actually expands contract liability by making
some lost profits and consequential damages recoverable. Id. at 51-52.
19. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/4

4

McNamara: Tortious Breach of Contract in Oklahoma

19841

TOR TIO US BREACH OF CONTA4CT

not be discouraged." ° Basically, a breach is economically efficient if
one party to a contract pays the other party full compensatory damages, and is still better off than if performance had been compelled

under the contract.: ' Such a redistribution of wealth is desirable if the
22
breaching party values his gains more than the loser values his losses.

The fallacy with the efficient breach theory is the idea that full compensatory damages are recoverable. There will always be some costs that

are unrecoverable.23
The rationale behind denying punitive damages for a breach of
contract may be the same basis used to specifically deny recovery for

mental distress, humiliation, indignity, and wounded feelings caused
by a breach of contract.24 Generally, the rule which precludes such a

recovery, whether as punitive25 or compensatory,26 is based on the
principle that mental suffering is properly a parasitic element to bodily
20. SeeE. FARNSWORTH, supranote 10, § 12.3, at 817 (1982); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAW § 4.9, at 88-90 (2d ed. 1977); A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979) (explaining that the law will supply terms where the parties have not done so
explicitly, but the parties are normally free to supplant with their own, more efficient terms);
Birmingham, Breach of Contract,Damages, Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L.
REV. 273, 284 (1979); cf Barton, The Economic Basis ofDamagesfor Breach of Contract, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 278-79 (1972).
21. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1, at 786 (1973); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9, at 89 (2d ed. 1977); E.g, Diamond, supra note 2, at 435-36.
22. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 12.3, at 817 n.3. This is known as the Kaldor or
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, initially stated in Kaldor, Welfare Propositionsof Economics andinterpersonalComparisonsof Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); see also Hicks, The Foundationsof Welfare
Economics,49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
See also Diamond, supra note 2, at 433. Diamond views this concept as "the undisclosed
underlying rationale" which explains the "unexplained judicial reluctance to impose tort liability
upon those who in bad faith, breach. . ." Id (emphasis added). Describing it as "one of the
most poorly kept secrets in legal history," he states that a "close scrutiny of commercial law doctrine and the briefest scrutiny of commercial practice, makes it transparently clear that our system
not only sanctions such bad faith breaches but, with limitations, actually encourages them." Id
Furthermore, he laments judicial "zeal to deny that the law provides incentive to breach." Id. at
436.
"[I]t is an open secret that a contract breaker rarely stands to lose as much by his breach as he
would by performance. And the more deliberate the breach, the more apt he is to gain." Mueller,
ContractRemedies, Business Fact and Legal Fancy, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 833, 835.
23. See generally Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead under UCC 2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and ContractualRemedyPolicy,57 CORNELL L. REv. 681, 687 (1972) ("in short
both the costs of using the legal system and the difficulty of establishing the amount of loss are
critical factors in the decision to sue"); see also Lef, Injury, IgnoranceandSpite-The Dynamicsof
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1, 8 (1970) (citing reasons for the high cost of due process).
24. See FARNSWORTH, YOUNG & JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 530 (2d ed.
1972).
25. 5 A. CORBIN, supra, note 15, § 1077, at 442; see also Ellis, Fairnessand Efficiency in the
Law ofPunitiveDamages,56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983) (one purpose of punitive damages is to
compensate victims for otherwise uncompensable losses).
26. The general purpose of granting compensatory damages in a contract action is to put the
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant not breached. See 5
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harm.27 Historically, there could be no award at all if the mental harm
was independent of bodily harm.2" Today intentional or reckless infliction of mental distress is a tortious cause of action in itself,29 but the
parasitic theory and general rule still holds in contract law. 30 Accordingly, it seems fair to question why contract law should provide shelter
to such conduct.3 '
B.

The Middle View
The traditional view has gradually been eroded away to the point

where the exceptions have almost totally engulfed the general rule.32
The first direct exceptions were breach of a promise to marry 33 and
failure to provide a public service.3 4 Many indirect exceptions have

followed, but each new case and exception seems to be only a variation
on the same theme, that the defendant's action at the time of breach

constituted an independent tort. 35

CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1002, at 31; 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1338, at 198 (3d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1983).
Damages for mental suffering are generally regarded as being actual or compensatory in
character, and not vindictive or punitive. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 197, at 277 (1965). However, the contrary is true in some states as to those damages which are allowed for insult, indignity, and the like. Id. at 278.
27. See 5 A. CORtBIN, supra note 15, § 1076, at 427-28.
28. See id at 429-30.
29. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 12, at 52; Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
30. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1076, at 427-28. Comment, B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan:
Breakthrough in the Law's Reluctance to Award Damages in Contract/or MentalAnguish and Other
Non-economic Detriments, 26 S.D.L. REV. 48 (1981); Comment, Recoveryfor MentalAnguishfrom
Breach of Contract: The Needfor an Enabling Statute, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 88 (1968).
31. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1077C, at 304 (Kaufman Supp. 1984). "[A] strong
trend has developed toward allowing punitive damages ... where the defendant has the same
state of mind as an intentional tortfeasor, but chooses to accomplish his ends by means of a breach
of contract instead of undertaking to commit a separate tort." Id See also Z.D. Howard Co. v.
Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla. 1975) ("Consummation of the contract does not shield the
wrongdoer or preclude recovery of [punitive] damages.
...).
32. See FARNSWORTH, supranote 10, § 12.8, at 842-44. Consideration of all of the exceptions
leads one commentator to ask "are the exceptions swallowing the rule?" Sassaman, supra note 2,
at 86.
33. See Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 90 (1791). See also Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 244,
124 P. 1083, 1084 (1912) ("While the action for breach of promise of marriage is one which has its
inception in the violation ... of a contract, the authorities have, since a very early date, very
generally treated the action as. . . a tort.").
34. Fort Smith & W. Ry. v. Ford, 34 Okla. 575, 575, 126 P. 745, 745 (1912) (a railroad's
failure to transport a passenger to proper station "states a cause of action sounding in tort rather
than contract," since the "gist of the action being defendant's breach of a public duty" and "the
contract of carriage is regarded as a mere inducement to the action to show the right to sue as a
passenger").
35. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Under this view, the occurrence of an actual or alleged breach of
contract is collateral or incidental to the tortious behavior arising independent of the contract. Commentators have taken a variety of ap36
proaches in grouping, distinguishing and explaining these exceptions.
Basically, the exceptions can be grouped into six categories.
37
1. Breach of a Promise to Marry

Punitives have been allowed for a breach of a promise to marry if
accompanied by conduct that is cruel, fraudulent, malicious, or actuated by evil motives.38 Punitive damages are usually awarded to compensate for mental suffering, social disgrace, humiliation or
embarrassment 39 as well as to punish the defendant, 4 0 to set an example to prevent future offenses, and to express community approbation.41
The reasoning behind the promise to marry exception is that it involves
personal rather than pecuniary interests, and is therefore
analogous to
4
the present-day tort of infliction of mental distress.
2. Breach of a Public Service Contract 3
Public utilities, common carriers, banks or others who enjoy a monopoly or quasi-monopoly position in a community may be found to
have committed a tortious breach of a statutory duty by failing to provide adequate services." The basis for this exception has been to "both
36. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 251-52, 281 (grouping all exceptions under one of four
labels, and explaining that these four are really one exception: breach of an implied-in-law duty);
Simpson, supranote 2, at 287 (also finding only two categories: breach accompanied by fraud and
breach accompanied by an independent tort); Sassaman, supranote 2, at 93-95 (simply addressing
each of six exceptions); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 226, 229, 236, 240, 250-51 (after addressing
exceptions of ordinary duty, fraud, and independent torts in general and insurance cases, he concludes, that the disparity in bargaining power is the reason for the increase of punitive damage
awards in contracts); Note, The Expanding Availability, supranote 2, at 688 (breaking exceptions
into breach plus fraud and breach plus oppression).
37. In a number of states this right of action has been abolished by statute. 12 AM. JUR. 2D
Breach ofPromise § 18, at 717 (1965). But cf., OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 40 (1981) ("damages... rest
in sound discretion of the jury").
38. See I1 C.J.S. Breach of Marriage Promise§ 45, at 813-14 (1966).
39. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Promise § 27, at 727 (1965); 11 C.J.S. Breach of Marriage
Promise § 45, at 813-14 (1966).
40. Punishment is for the original act(s) plus any attempts to blacken the plaintiffs character
in defense. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1077, at 441-42.
41. See id.at 440-43 and § 1076, at 430-32.
42. SeeD. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 12.4, at 819-21. "The essential idea seems to be that some
contracts clearly have what might be called personal rather than pecuniary purposes in view, and
that the purpose of such contracts is utterly frustrated until mental distress damages are awarded
for the breach." .d. at 819.
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44. For a thorough historical background regarding this exception seegeneralyBurdick, The
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punish and protect against the abuse of economic power," 45 and "to
protect the public against exploitation or oppression." 46 Again, it is
within the jury's discretion to award punitives if the conduct was sufficiently unreasonable, malicious, wanton, oppressive, or wrongful.47
3. Breach Accompanied by Fraud
Fraud was the first of the modem day exceptions48 and is generally
referred to as the South Carolina rule.49 Cases involving this exception
epitomize judicial restivity in this quasi-tort, quasi-contract area.50 The
vague and ambiguous nature of this exception 5 has prompted one
commentator to state, "A rule composed of concepts so obscure can be
described as a governing legal doctrine only by a long leap of faith. 52
Moreover, it is a rule resting upon "deceptive concepts" 3 that "provides convenient camouflage for otherwise legally indefensible
Originof the PeculiarDuties of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1911); Wyman,
The Law o/Public Callingsas a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156 (1904).
45. Wyman, supranote 44, at 226.
46. Id at 224.
47. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1077, at 444.
48. See Note, Punitive DamagesforBreach o/Contractin South Carolina,10 S.C.L. REV. 444,
448-58 (1958); see also Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904) (explains history and

evolution of the rule).
49. As opposed to the Texas rule, which requires the breach to be accompanied by an independent tort. Although the Texas rule appears to be broader than the South Carolina rule,
probably the contrary is true:
Under the Texas rule, before the plaintiff can recover punitive damages the facts must be
such that he actually has two causes of action, one in tort and one in contract. Under the
[S.C.] rule the action for breach... may be the only action open to the plaintiff, as
where the accompanying fraudulent act is a mere omission for which no tort action in
deceit would be.
Simpson, supra note 2, at 287-88.
Even the court which first adopted this view recognized that the term "fraud" was both broad
and vague, and that their holding could result in punitives being allowed based on a finding of
merely "dealing unfairly." Wright v. Public Sav. Ins. Co., 204 S.E.2d 57, 59 (S.C. 1974).
Fraud assumes so many hues and forms, that courts are compelled to content themselves
with comparatively few general rules for its discovery and defeat, and allow the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case to bear heavily upon the conscience and judgment of
the court or jury in determining its presence or absence.
Id.
50. Some cases in this area show creative courts using a variety of explanations to allow the
award of punitives while appearing not to violate the general rule. See infra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text. However, "[t]he judicial freedom derived from a definition of fraud couched
in obscure terms exacts an important price: it makes the prediction of results in future cases,
always a hazardous undertaking, especially treacherous." Sullivan, supranote 2, at 231.
51. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 261-69 (providing a critical analysis of the largely unsuccessful efforts to use this exception in Florida); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 229-36.
52. Sullivan, supranote 2, at 235-36.
53. Id at 236.
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decisions."5 4

Despite the vagueness problem, the exception still requires a finding of malice, ill will, oppression, wanton disregard for the fights of
others, or wrongfulness.
4.

Breach of Duty of Good Faith

Breach of good faith is a common law exception possibly born in
the frustration of hard cases, in which the action involved did not constitute a recognized tort but the failure to award punitives would en-

courage wrongful and oppressive behavior. 5

The majority of these

actions involved insurance cases.

Since the landmark case of Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 56 almost
every jurisdiction has recognized a tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract.5 7 The basis for this action is that while in every contract
there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which accompa-

nies the expressed contractual obligations,58 a separate implied-in-law
duty also arises, and it is the breach of this duty, not the contractual

obligations, which will justify the award of punitive damages.5 9 An-

other rationale is that when an insurance company forces an unfair
settlement, unreasonably refuses to settle, or wrongfully cancels cover-

age it is committing a tortious abuse of economic power.6" As before,

54. Id at 236.
55. See Note, The ExpandingAvailability, supra note 2, at 678-79.
56. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). In Crisc, the insurer refused a
settlement offer of $9,000 from a party with a claim against the insured, ostensibly because the
policy limit was $10,000 and thus the insurer stood little to lose by going to court. Id. at _ 426
P.2d at 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16. The ensuing suit resulted in the insured being held liable
for $101,000. Id. at __ 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The insured then endured severe
emotional distress in addition to economic collapse. Id The Criscicourtaffirmed an award to the
insured of $25,000 punitives for mental harm from the insurer, in addition to compensatory damages. Id. at _, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
57. See J. MCCARTHY, supranote 2, at 117-23 (Supp. 1982) (summarizes the status of the tort
or statute used in every jurisdiction to award punitives for breach of duty of good faith).
58. UCC § 1-203 (1977); Summers, "GoodFaith"inGeneral ContractLaw andthe Sales Provisions ofthe Un!form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 216 (1968); see also Louderback &
Jurika, supra note 2, at 192-96 (short summary of both the relevant UCC and common law on

good faith).
59. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins., 11 Cal. 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974); Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); McCarty v. First of Ga. Ins. Co.,
713 F.2d 609 (Okla. 1983); Gay v. Taylor, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 550 F. Supp. 710
(Okla. 1981); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). See also
Diamond, supra note 2, at 425-29; Louderback & Jurika, supra note 2, at 196-202; J. MCCARTHY,

supra note 2, § 1.35, at 84-87.
60. See Louderback & Jurika, supranote 2, at 198-99 (noting several types of wrongful con-
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this tort requires a finding of6 malice, fraud, gross negligence, wantonness, or oppressive behavior. 1
Although the breach of good faith exception has been expanded to
non-insurance cases,62 these cases fail to articulate objective standards
that could be used to determine when an actionable implied-in-law
duty may be found. 3
5. Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
A breach of a fiduciary duty' has been found to warrant punitive
damages because it is a breach of an implied-in-law duty created by the
relationship rather than the contract itself.65 Just as the term fraud is
vague and lacking in objective content, so too is the phrase "fiduciary
relationship. 66 Consequently, the finding of an implied fiduciary relationship is haphazard, inconsistent and unpredictable. Furthermore, it
ignores the fact that the relationship was created by, and essentially is,
the contract.
6. Other Exceptions
There have been other exceptions used in a variety of areas including employment, commercial contracts, landlord-tenant, and conduct by insurance companies will warrant punitives); Note, The ExpandingAvailability,supranote
2, at 678-79. "If the courts deny punitives for such oppression they are positively encouraging this
sort of barbarism." Id. at 679.
61. Crisc 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
62. SeeJ. MCCARTHY, supranote 2, § 6.1, at 335-37; But cf.Iron Mtn. Sec. Storage v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Declining to expand this approach beyond insurance cases, the court criticized this middle view approach in general. Noting a duty of
good faith is implied in every contract, the court wrote "that it is a broad jump from that premise
to the conclusion that breach of this duty should be separately actionable in tort merely because
the duty is imposed by law rather than by consensual agreement of the parties. Not every breach
of a legal duty is actionable in tort." Id.at 1166. "Breach of the duty is synonymous with breach
of the contract." Id. at 1169 (citing Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 11-12 (1859)).
63. "Good faith has no definite meaning; the reasons for invocation in a particular case are
not always clear." Summers, "Good Faith"in GeneralContractLaw andthe SalesProlslonsofthe
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968).
64. See, e.g., PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 417 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 918 (1970); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App.
2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1967); Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956); Harper v.
Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Ore. 26, 120 P.2d 757 (1942); see also Coleman, supranote 2, at 289-92,
n.98 (citing an additional seven cases, with a discussion of two cases); J.MCCARTHY, supranote 2,
§ 2.10, at 110-11.
65. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 110-11.
66. Sullivan describes the terms fiduciary relationship, relationship of trust, and confidential
relationship as "vague, haphazard and fragmentary." See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 229 n.119
(citing Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 237
(1928)). Sullivan concludes, "In reality such terms are almost as flexible as a court wishes to make
them." Sullivan, supra note 2, at 229.
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involve a transference to one of
sumerism. These exceptions generally
67
an uncounted number of

torts.

The preceding exceptions demonstrate the rationale behind middle view cases. The cases following the middle view perpetuate the
legal fiction of an implied duty arising outside and independent of the
contract. This rationale, though nobly inspired, is flawed since these
duties do not predate the contract, but arise from it. A breach of these
implied duties is a breach of the contract.
C. Bad Faith Breach as a Free-StandingTort
This third view rejects the cumbersome approaches of the middle
view by adopting a single tort action, available for any sufficiently malicious breach of contract. 8 Under this view, breach of the contract
itself may constitute a tortious act. 69 The recognition of bad faith
breach of contract as a free-standing tort eliminates the need for courts
to refer to legal fictions in order to promote justice. Also, the adoption
of a more direct and simple basis for allowing punitives creates the
appearance of greater legal legitimacy for such actions, thus hastening
legal consistency and predictability in this area of law. This view dramatically redefines the general rule because in every case the breaching
party's motives would be relevant for determining the degree of bad
faith present.7 °
1. The Prima Facie Case
The prima facie case for the new tort of bad faith breach of contract is presently unclear, its parameters undelineated, and its basis elusive.7 ' However, many commentators already seem convinced that at
67. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1077B (Kaufman Supp. 1984); J.
note 2, at §§ 6.1 to .11.

MCCARTHY,

supra

68. "Therefore, it is the finding of the court that the actions of the defendant were such as to
be a breach ofcontract amounting to a wilful, wanton and malicious tort and fixes punitive damages.
... Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (C.P. Franklin
County 1970) (emphasis added).
69. Id; see infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
70. It is usually the defendant's mental state that is said to justify a punitive award, not his
outward conduct. Therefore, punitive damages are never available for simple negligence. See
DOBBS, supra note 21, § 3.9, at 205; C. McCoRMicK, supra note 17, § 18, at 280; W. PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 2, at 9-10.
71. See Coleman, supra note 2. She, rejects the individual area exceptions of the middle
view, but advocates the implied-in-law approach. She proposes a three-prong test:
(1) There must be contract.
(2) Plaintiff must show an implied-in-law duty.
(3) There must be a malicious or willful breach that causes injury to the plaintiff.
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the heart of this action is the concept of oppression.7 2 This view is

supported by the public policy that the courts should lean toward protecting those with lesser bargaining power.73 If this is the case, a collat-

eral issue is raised as to whether this tort will be applicable beyond
circumstances involving disparity in bargaining power and adhesion
contracts.
Although the standards for the degree of bad faith required have

not been fully established, it is clear that a mere intentional breach
alone is not enough.74 Undoubtly, the standard will call for a finding
of malice, unconscionability, evil intent, or the intentional and wanton
harming of the other party.75 One suggested definition for the willful
bad faith breach of contract is "a knowing breach by a party capable of
performing made with an unreasonable lack of regard for the other
party." 76 Unfortunately, the use of the broad term "unreasonable"
could be interpreted as requiring the plaintiff to carry the heavy burden

of proving the defendant's behavior was intentional. 77 Furthermore,
the door to arguments of economic waste and
the term could open
78
disproportionality.

While lawyers may struggle to finesse a definition for the standard,
comfort can be found in that type of errant behavior to be condemned
.d at 257-58.
72. E.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 3.9, at 206-07; Sullivan, supra note 2, at 249-51; Note,
The Expanding Availability,supra note 2, at 687.

73. There are numerous cases where the relative bargaining power of the parties had an
impact on the decision. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965) (plaintiff made significant expenditures and preparations during negotiations for purchase
of a supermarket franchise, reliance interest granted based on promissory estoppel); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969) (contract found to be unconscionable and
the plaintiff relieved of making further payments after paying $600 of $1,235 sales price for home
freezer worth a maximum of $300 retail); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Store, 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (contract which allowed defendant to repossess prior and/or subsequent
purchases by low-income plaintiff upon default on single purchase held to be unenforceable as
unconscionable); Ortelere v. Teacher's Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 250
N.E.2d 460 (1969) (reversal of change in election on retirement plan allowed after death of insured
persuant to a new standard for mental capacity); see Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion.- 7he German Version, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1041 (1976); Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalCon.
tract Doctrines, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, BargainingIn Good
Faith,andFreedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1969); Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code--the Emperor' New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
74. See 5 A. CoRBIN, supranote 15, § 1077B (Kaufman Supp. 1984).
75. Id
76. Marschall, Willfulness: A CrucialFactorin ChoosingRemediesfor Breach of Contract,24
A IZ.
L. REv.733, 758 (1982).
77. Id
78. Id
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is intuitively recognizable.79 Simply put, it is when the breacher was
more than just unsavory or wrong; it is when his breach, by nature of
the contract or method of breach, unconscionably or maliciously harms
the plaintiff.
Despite any inherent conceptual difficulties, the tort of bad faith
breach is preferable since it directly addresses the problem of malicious
breaches by placing substance ahead of legal form. The focus under
this third view concerns the severity of the breaching conduct, while the
focus under the middle view is on shaping the breaching conduct to fit
a separately actionable tort.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter said, "Proper accommodation is dependent on an empiric process, on case-to-case determinations. Abstract propositions and unquestioned generalities do not furnish
answers." 80 Juries are assigned other tasks of reification, and this one
does not appear to be any more strenuous. Moreover, juries should be
trusted to distinguish those breaches that are accompanied by aggravating circumstances which go beyond what is socially tolerable.
2.

Case Law'

The leading case under the third view is Vernon Fire and Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Sharp.82 In Vernon the insurer, without reasonable
explanation, refused to pay the insured's legitimate claim for a factory
79. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.5, at 213 (3rd ed. 1983).
80. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 76 (1956).
81. The cases which support a new tort of bad faith breach are numerous but not
comprehensive. See, e.g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 50-51 (Fla. 1974) (malicious

prosecution case, holding only legal, not actual, malice required for award of punitives whether
action for tort or breach of contract; legal malice inferrable from wanton disregard for rights of
others); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, _, 501 P.2d 368, 369 (1972) (wanton or reckless

refusal to honor reservations was breach of contract constituting a tort for emotional distress);
Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381, 382 (1974) (bad
faith failure to settle'claim was breach of contract sufficient to find conduct amounted to heedless
disregard of consequences, malice, gross fraud or oppression); Food Fair Stores v. Havey, 275 Md.
50, 52-55, 338 A.2d 43, 45-46 (1975) (reversing punitives in dispute over employee benefits because
the breach lacked the requisite elements of actual malice, express animosity, a sole purpose to
harm rather than benefit self or circumstances which give rise to inferences of oppression);
Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst. of Detroit, 51 Mich. App. 220, 221-22, 214 N.W.2d 864, 864 (1974)
(punitives denied in breach of teaching contract by employer for lack of malice, however, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover for mental anguish since the contract was personal in nature and
intimately bound up with matters of mental concern and solicitude); Eakman v. Robb, 237
N.W.2d 423, 430 (N.D. 1975) (punitives awarded in a bad faith breach of restrictive covenants
since damages at law were not sufficient to compensate plaintiffs for irreversible damages); Kirk v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc, 44, 46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (C.P. Franklin County 1970) (bad faith
failure to honor insurance claim was malicious breach of contract constituting a tort).
82. 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381 (1974), modfed,264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976).
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fire loss. After acknowledging the traditional rule8" and middle view

exceptions,84 the Supreme Court of Indiana set forth a new two-part
standard: "a serious wrong" must have been committed and "[it] must
also appear that the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect" of a punitive award.8 5 Because the court emphasized that no find-

ing of an independent tort must be proven, 86 the court effectively
moved beyond the middle view. Moreover, by holding that the punitive award was granted for tortious conduct, the court managed to by-

pass the traditional view without violating it.

7

In short, Vernon held

that punitives could be awarded for breach of contract per se, if the

breach was accompanied by intentional, wanton and oppressive conduct.8 8 Vernon now appears to be sound law and has been followed in
89
both insurance and non-insurance cases.
Likewise, in Cleary v. American Airlines,9" the California Court of

Appeals extended a good faith concept, developed in previous insur-

ance cases, to allow for the possible award of punitives in a non-insurance situation. 91 In Cleary an employee of eighteen years was
wrongfully discharged for engaging in union activities. The court
stated that American Airlines had a good faith duty that was uncondi83. Punitives are not recoverable in contract actions and motive is generally irrelevant. 264

Ind. at 607, 349 N.E.2d at 179-80.
84. Id at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
85. Id
86. "Neither of these functions of the independent [tort] requirement is very compelling
when it appears. . . a serious wrong, tortious in nature, has been committed, but the wrong does
not conveniently fit the confines of a predetermined tort." Id. "When these factors coalesce, ...
the independent tort requirement [will] be abrogated." Id The court noted that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find fraud, despite the plaintiffs failure to plead fraud. Id. at 614,
349 N.E.2d at 184. Justice Prentice, however, disputed the existence of fraud, Id at 617, 349
N.E.2d at 185 (Prentice J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180-81.
88. Id at 608, 615, 349 N.E.2d at 180-81, 184. The court 1) found tortious conduct without
an "independent tort," 2) found the breach tortious since in contract law punitives cannot be
awarded, and 3) determined a breach could be tortious despite contract law proscribing inquiry
into motive.
89. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (breach of
franchise agreement); Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) (sale of defective
mobile home); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 163 Ind. App. 308, 323 N.E.2d 270 (1975) (breach of
contract on a life insurance policy). See also Linscott v. Ranier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854,
-, 606 P.2d 958, 963-64 (1980) (concluding Vernon preferable to general rule because it serves a
consumer protection function).
Vernon has also been cited in cases where the conduct involved was not found to be sufficiently tortious, thus indicating that the third view would not make punitives available for every
breach. See Owen County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. Waeger, - Ind. App. -, 398 N.E.2d 713
(1980).
90. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
91. Id at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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tional and independent of the terms of the contract.9 2 The court went
on to note that, "A termination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law convenant of good'
faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts,including employment
93
contracts."
Correspondingly, in Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark94 the Supreme
Court of Idaho awarded the plaintiff punitives after the new car he had
purchased from the defendant was found to be second hand. In support of this outcome, the court stated, "[tlhe rule . . . is that punitive
damages may be assessed in contract actions where there is fraud, malice, oppression or other sufficient reasonfordoing so."91
Punitive damages have also been awarded for bad faith breach of
large commercial contracts. For instance, in Whioeld Construction
Company, Inc. v. CommercialDevelopment Corporatiot9 6 the defendant's failure to honor pay requests, unjustified delay in seeking consultation for a construction decision, and attempts to hamstring the
plaintiff/contractor towards the end of a construction project were all
bad faith breaches warranting a punitive award of $50,000. 9 ' Similarly, in B. B. Walker Company v. Ashland Chemical Company 9 a contract for the sale of 30 million pounds of a styrene-butadiene rubber
was breached by Ashland. In addition, Ashland attempted to induce
Walker's customers to deal with a major competitor of Walker. The
court concluded that "the conduct of the defendant, both in its deliberate breach of the contract and its conduct thereafter, [are found] to
have been willful, malicious, reckless and unfair; findings which warrant punitive damages." The court consequently approved a punitive
award for bad faith breach in the amount of $250,000. 99
III. ToRIOus BREACH IN OKLAHOMA
A.

A Statutory Problem
Despite statutory authority expressly limiting exemplary damages
92. Id.
93. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis added).
94. 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969).

95. Id. at 907, 453 P.2d 556 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
96.
97.
98.
99.

392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I. 1975).
Id. at 1007.
474 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
Id. at 664, 666 (citing Newton v. Standard Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105,

._

229 S.E.2d 297, 301,

302 (1976)).
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Oklahoma courts have

to "obligation(s) not arising from contract,""

awarded punitive damages in bad faith breaches involving willful negligence,' 0 ' fraud, 02 conversion, 0 3 gross negligence,'t4 and oppression
or malicious disregard for another's rights. 0 5 The usual rationale
100. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 22 (1981). The Oklahoma statute states that,
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arisingfrom contract,where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of
punishing the defendant.
Id.(emphasis added). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 21, 61 (1981).
Numerous Oklahoma cases have followed the rule that punitives cannot be awarded on a
breach of contract. See e.g., Phillips Mach. Co. v. LeBlond Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318,325 (N.D. Okla.
1980) (breach of distribution agreement); Wheeler v. Stuckley, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
279 F. Supp. 712, 715 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (omission of phone book listing); Fox v. Overton, 534
P.2d 679, 681 (Okla. 1975) (failure to purchase stock); Pointer v. Hill, 536 P,2d 358, 361 (Okla.
1975) (violation of broker's exclusive listing contract); Burton v. Juzwik, 524 P.2d 16, 19-20 (Okla.
1974) (breach of oral trust agreement by transfer of an oil and gas lease).
101. See Lilly v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 27 Okla. 830, 115 P. 347 (1911) (train passenger suffered a loss of time, additional fares and inconveniences when carried beyond her junction
point in disregard of repeated efforts for service and information).
102. See Hobbs v. Smith, 31 Okla. 521, 122 P. 502 (1912) (sale of hogs allegedly known to be
infected with cholera despite promises to the contrary). Since Hobbs, fraud has been frequently
used to justify punitive awards for actions arising from a contract. See Investors Preferred Life
Ins Co. v. Abraham, 375 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1967) (surviving corporation liable for false representations regarding stock ownership by executive of merged corporation); Bridgess v. Youree, 436 F.
Supp. 458 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (agent/horse trainer induced client to sell horse at price known to be
below actual value); Payne v. Volkswagon, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 565 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (sale of a defective automobile); Taylor v. Parker, 611 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1980) (real estate agent misrepresented
his authority to sell property); Barnes v. McKinney, 589 P.2d 698 (Okla. 1978) (contractor acquired final payment on home construction by falsely representing that the plumbing had passed
final city inspection); Z. D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975) (involving the
intentional sale of a used car as new); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brown, 519 P.2d 491 (Okla.
1974) (town residences relied on telephone company's broken promise to provide area wide service). But cf.Smith v. Johnston, 591 P.2d 1260 (Okla. 1978) (electrician's inferior and dangerous
wiring insufficient to support finding of fraud); Allred v. Rabon, 572 P.2d 979 (Okla. 1977) (concealment of an alleged breach of duty to file an estate claim did not suffice to prove fraud in an
attorney malpractice suit where the original negligent breach of duty was not sufficiently proven
and a separate cause of action for fraud was not plead); Fox v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679, 681 (Okla.
1975) (allegation that defendant "willfully and fraudulently refused to complete said sale as
agreed" did not suffice as fraud even though the failure to abide by the sales agreement resulted in
plaintiff having to close his business).
103. See Davidson v. First Bank and Trust Co., 609 P.2d 1259 (Okla. 1976) (malicious equipment repossession); Sopkin v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 539 P.2d 1393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (malicious or reckless repossession and resale by auto dealer).
104. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939) (failure to provide
reasonable gas service resulted in a breach of an implied duty of reasonable care).
105. See Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67, 68, 70 (Okla. 1970) (pollution resulting
from lessee's 31 separate salt water leaks evidenced such reckless disregard as to infer malice);
Tomlinson v. Bailey, 289 P.2d 384, 387 (Okla. 1954) (oil property lessee allowed salt water to
overflow onto owner's land, enabling jury to infer malice from the reckless disregard of owner's
rights); Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla. 4, 190 P.2d 451 (1947) (lessee's unnecessary damage to oil and
gas wells, or sabotage, found sufficient to warrant punitives which were reversed due to defendant's death prior to trial); Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co., 576 P.2d 317 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977)
(lessee's salt-water pollution due to ten-year-old pipes, known to be rusted out, evidenced such
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given by the courts is that
every contract carries with it the common law duty to perform with
care, skill, reasonable expediency and faithfulness which, if
breached, may be treated as a tort as well as a breach, giving the
injured party the option to elect which legal course to pursue. This
allows recovery in situations where a breach of contract results from
willful, intentional, purposeful or malicious conduct, thus expanding
damages ordinarily excluded
the statutory right to recover punitive
°6
by statute in contract actions.

Although these middle view holdings are ostensibly based on a
tort separate from bad faith breach itself, the cases are, nevertheless,
still blatantly contrary to the statutes. The existence of a contract obligation and relationship in these cases cannot be ignored or fairly described as merely incidental to the action. Consider, for instance, the
difference between a situation where a defendant devised a contractual
relationship intentionally designed to harm the plaintiff and another
situation where a contract was originally made in good faith but was
later maliciously breached. 1° 7 The distinction between the two situations is moot under the generic terms of whether the harm arose from a
contractual obligation. In fact, one might argue that under both scenarios it is the breach of the agreement which proximately causes the
harm.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has also directly
rebuked this statutory objection. In a recent insurance case, the court
expressly disapproved two prior federal district court decisions which
invoked the statutes to limit recovery on an insurance contract to the
face value of the policy. 108 The Oklahoma court gave little explanation
other than to say it was the intent of the legislature that insurance companies be imposed with an obligation to pay valid claims promptly. 0 9
reckless disregard as to infer malice); Holliman v. Ed Grier Volkswagen, Inc., 554 P.2d 117 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976) (car salesman's inducing customer to leave car, later converted, and impeding
discovery of used car's defects evidenced oppressive overreaching to gain unfair advantage); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Goings, 527 P.2d 603, 605, 609 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (malice and oppression
inferred from repossession of auto after full payment tendered).
106. Djowhazaden v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616, 620, n.3 (Okla. App. 1982)
(quoting Natural Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939)).
107. See supra note 70; Food Fair Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50,-, 338 A.2d 43, 45-46 (1975)
(discussing use of contract to deliberately harm).

108. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 903-04 (Okla. 1977) (disapproving Renfroe v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Okla. 1969); Ledford
v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 318 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970)).

109. Christian, 577 P.2d at 903.
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The New Tort
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma appeared to strongly support the

new tort of bad faith breach in Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co.,"' which could be considered as Oklahoma's delayed response to

Crisci."II Christianwent further than Crisciin several respects,1 1 2 but
was based on the same implied-in-law duty concept which was further
emphasized in California by Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co."I3 The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma reinforced this view again in Timmons v.
Royal Globe InsuranceCo.'1 4 However, in another recent case, Mann v.

State Farm MutualAuto Insurance Co.,' 11 the court wrote:
Christian contemplated that as a general rule the action in tort and
the actions in contract would be brought together, arising as they do
from the same transaction. Oklahoma has adopted the general rule
that a cause of action includes all theories of recovery or types of
damages stemming from one occurrence or transaction ....

These Oklahoma insurance cases are very similar to the California insurance cases in that they acknowledge that the implied convenant or

duty arises from the contract, but deny that the recovery of punitive
damages is allowed for the breach of contract itself.' 17

Although it appears that Oklahoma has effectively adopted the
new tort for insurance cases, it is unclear as to whether the tort will be
expanded outside the insurance field." 8 Authority against the adop110. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
111. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
112. Christian was based on bad faith conduct which was much more subtle, "the wrongful
conduct being in the nature of a deviation from standard ethical business practices; a simple refusal to settle promptly," while the conduct in the California cases was "apparent and outrageous." Comment, New Tort, infra note 118, at 610; see supra notes 56, 59, 60 and accompanying
text. In California an insurer must give the interests of the insured at least as much consideration
as it gives its own; in Oklahoma the insurer must give the insured's interest more than his own.
See Comment, New Tort, infra note 118, at 611.
113. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (1973).
114. 653 P.2d 907, 911-12 (Okla. 1982); see Recent Development, Timmons, inyra note 118, at
351-52.
115. 699 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1983).
116. Id. at 772; see Rutherford v. Halliburton Co., 572 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1977) (damages may be
sought in only one lawsuit).
117. See Gruenburg,9 Cal. 3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (quoting
Crisci, 66 Cal. at 430,426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 71) (California denials); Timmons v. Royal
Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 911-13 (Okla. 1982) (Okla. denials). See also Manis v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1984). In Manis,the court, noting that insurers have a right to a good
faith dispute, reversed an award for punitive damages because it was not clearly shown that the
insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withheld payment. Id at 762. The court clearly distinguished the case from others where "there was a breach of duty independent of the breach of
contract." Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American
Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, New Tort]; Re-

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/4

18

McNamara: Tortious Breach of Contract in Oklahoma

1984]

TORTIOUS BREACH OF CONTRACT

tion of the new tort in Oklahoma dates back to 1936 when the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma decided SinclairRefining Co. v. Shaffer."9 In Sinclair, the plaintiff owned a filling station and the defendant was his
supplier. 2 ' The defendant also rented him equipment that was necessary for handling, storing, dispensing and advertising. After the plaintiff refused to accept an offer by the defendant to buy his station, the
defendant removed his equipment in an attempt to force the plaintiff
out of business, thereby breaching the contract. 12 1 The jury awarded
the plaintiff $929.20, including $500.00 for punitive damages,122 however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the punitive damages
award and held that the trial judge should not have given instructions
permitting the punitive damages because the "action was founded upon
contract and not upon tort."'1 23 The fact that the defendant was guilty
of malice, actual or presumed, 24 was viewed as irrelevant.
In contrast, the same court in Smith v. Johnston125 expressly contemplated that the "relation between remedies in contract and tort is a
confused field."' 126 In Smith, the plaintiff sued the general contractor
and electrician hired to build his home' 27 because aluminum wire was
used rather than the agreed copper, and the installation was so negligent as to be a fire hazard. 2 8 The jury awarded $432.25 in actual damages' 29 against both defendants in addition to punitive damages 13of0
$25,000 against the contractor and $10,000 against the electrician.
The court, however, ordered remittitur of $5,000 against each defend3
ant, which the plaintiff accepted.' '
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled the finding of
cent Development, Insurer'sLiabilityforBadFaithDamages: Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co., 18 TULSA L.J. 349 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Recent Development, Timmons]. See also
Woodward, Punitive Damages for Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1125, 1125 (1983) (concludes that limiting punitive damages to insurance
contracts is discriminatory).
119. 177 Okla. 610, 61 P.2d 571 (1936).
120. Id at 571.
121. Id.
122. Id at 572.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. 591 P.2d 1260 (Okla. 1978).
126. Id. at 1262.
127. Id. at 1261.
128. Id.
129. Actual damages were attributable to the cost to make the house conform to the contract.
Id.
130. Id
131. Id
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fraud as erroneous since "the remedy of a finished product not conforming to the contract is nonperformance and not one based on
fraud."' 32 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the reduced verdict, concluding that the jury was properly instructed as to the "requirements of
actual damages and of finding malice through an utter indifference to
or conscious disregard for the owners rights as a 'willful and wanton'
133
course of action."
The significance of Smith is that it demonstrates judicial frustration with the middle view. The facts in Smith were sufficient for a finding of malice, 134 but were not sufficient to satisfy the requisite elements
of an established tort since there was not a sufficient finding of actual
harm necessary to support a claim of negligence. 35 Consequently, the
decision can only be explained by stretching a negligence theory or
condemning malicious behavior as being tortious in itself.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court further expressed a willingness to
consider malicious behavior in contractual situations when it decided
the recent case of Storck v. Cities Service Gas Co.' 36 Storck involved a
dispute over the interpretation of terms to a gas lease.' 37 The court first
concluded that "under [the] circumstances the contract interpretation
appears to be without malice and intent to deliberately injure as a matter of law."' 38 It explained, "The law does not require each party to a
contract to be infallibly correct in its interpretation of contract terms at
peril of being charged with punitive damages. It only requires that
each party conduct itself reasonably.' 3 9 Finally, the court continued
132. Id. at 1262. "We find no tort action based upon fraud nor evidence of fraud upon which
the jury could have allowed the actual damages determined.
Id.
133. Id. at 1264.
134. Id
135. A necessary element of negligence is that there must be "[alctual loss or damages result-

ing to the interests of another .... The threat of future harm, not yet realized is not enough

... . Negligent conduct in itself is not such an interference with the interests of the world at

large that there is any right to complain of it. ... W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 30, at 143-44.
The actual harm in Smith was just the actual cost of nonperformance. 591 P.2d at 1263.
136. 634 P.2d 1319 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).

137. Id at 1320. The case has rather technical facts, which were summarized in an oil and gas
article as follows:
In the unusual case of Storck. . .the lessee operated an underground gas storage facility, and the lessor sued for the right to drill to formations both above and below the
stored gas, though this was prohibited by the gas storage lease. The courts refused to
concel the gas storage lease, but they did hold that the landowners could drill to any
formation not used for storage, subject to supervision by the storage lessee. The lessors
were also held entitled to damages for any drainage that occurred after they filed suit.
Waldman, The Demise ofAutomatic Termination, 54 OKLA. B.J. 2767, 2770 (1983).
138. Storek, 634 P.2d at 1323.
139. Id (emphasis added).
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with these conspicuous words: "We agree certain contract breaches can
and do amount to tortious conduct; that such breaches, if founded in
malice, fraud or oppression, could even justify punitive damages.
However, breach

. .

under these circumstances does not automati-

cally form the basis for punitive damages.""
The court stated that the breach of the contract, considered alone,
was insufficient for an award of punitive damages, but remanded the
case to the trial court to determine the extent to which the requisite
facts for punitive damages, i.e., malice, fraud, or oppression, were
present. 141
It is difficult to read Storck without concluding the court has finally recognized the tort of bad faith breach of contract. It is interesting that there is no mention of the presaging insurance cases here.142
Although Storck may be just another "middle view" case, 143 it does
indicate that the Oklahoma Supreme Court could be in favor
of grant144
ing punitive damages if the breach is malicious enough.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has shown that the status of tortious breach
in Oklahoma is about on par with the rest of the nation as a whole.
This means that within this jurisdiction cases and other authority show
145
three successive and conflicting theories existing simultaneously.
These theories were described herein as the traditional, middle and
46
third views. 1
140. Id
141. Id. at 1324.
142. However, the court did cite six middle view cases. Id at 1323 n.2. See Oklahoma Natu-

ral Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768, 770 (1939) ("Accompanying every contract is a
common law duty to perform... with care, skill, reasonable expediency, and faithfulness, and a

failure... is a tort as well as a breach of contract..
").
143. See Jackson v. Glasgow, 622 P.2d 1088 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). In Jackson, the court
stated that exemplary damages are not allowed for breach of contractual obligations but may be
awarded if the defendant's breach amounts to an independent willful tort. Id at 1090.
144. Oklahoma seems to recognize an unnamed general tort where one recklessly or wantonly
disregards another's rights such that malice and evil intent may be inferred. See Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus. 661 P.2d 515, 515 (Okla. 1983) (asbestos products liability suit, setting standard of "reckless disregard for the public safety"); McCorkle v. Great Ad. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583,
586 (Okla. 1981) (failure to settle fire loss claim was unreasonable and malicious through indifference to and conscious disregard for plaintiffs rights); Smith v. Johnston, 591 P.2d 1260, 1264
(Okla. 1978) (homeowner awarded punitives from electrician whose poor workmanship constituted utter indifference to and conscious disregard for the owner's rights; punitives awarded per
finding of malice, and willful and wanton action); see supranotes 104-117 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 100-144 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
...
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The authority supporting the traditional and middle views is considerable.1 47 These two views clearly are the law, but predicting which
view will be applied in a given case, and therefore the outcome, is very
uncertain business. There is little authority supporting the third view,
however, the robust dicta in Storck,148 the essence of middle view cases
like Christian,'49 and problems with middle view cases like Smith, 150 all
combine to show the third view is present in Oklahoma. This work
refutes the argument that the middle view's transferance to other torts
suffice to make the tort of bad faith breach unnecessary. A fractionalized, indirect and often uncertain approach to the problem of bad faith
breach can hardly be preferable to the more candid third view. Allowing punitive damages for any sufficiently malicious breach of contract directly focuses on the heart of the wrongfulness and represents a
logical and natural progression of law.
Michael F McNamara
147.
148.
149.
150.

See
634
577
591

supranotes 100-I 10 and accompanying text.
P.2d 1319 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). See supra text accompanying note 140.
P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977). See supranotes 110-1 17 and accompanying text.
P.2d 1260 (OkIa. 1978). See supranotes 125-134 and accompanying text.
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